Be Social: The Web Agency Before Spotex, Between Experiments, Clients, and Impossible Margins

The original idea was not even a web agency.

We wanted to launch an e-commerce store for car parts and tuning. The name was JAP, short for Just Auto Parts. In our minds, it could become a younger version of AutoDOC, closer to tuning enthusiasts and built by two people who loved cars.

It was a huge idea—far too huge for two young people without capital, supply chains, e-commerce skills, or an understanding of what selling car parts really required.

At that time, we met someone who ran a large e-commerce business in another sector. We spoke to them to understand, at least broadly, how that world worked. Their account was useful because it came from direct experience, but it could not replace analysis of our own project.

The message we retained was simple: selling parts required stock, warehousing, and significant investment. The estimate was over €20,000 merely to start with a meaningful product range.

For us, that was an enormous amount. Yet instead of stopping to understand whether the model was sustainable, we kept working on what felt more accessible: the logo, the Facebook page, and the Shopify store.

For JAP, we commissioned a logo from a designer known through my partner. We paid about €140, which felt like an important investment at the time.

The result, however, did not represent what we wanted to build at all. It was a cursive signature, closer to the logo of a beauty salon or a pastry shop than an e-commerce store for car parts and tuning. We even argued over that choice.

Today, I do not think the problem was only the designer. We were the problem: we had no brief, no clear direction, no defined audience, and no ability to translate our project into a visual identity.

In the end, we redid it ourselves using an Impact font and GIMP. It was not a memorable brand identity, but it was the first time I truly started working with graphics, digital tools, and visual communication.

In 2017/2018, creating an e-commerce store was already possible, but there was no immediate access to AI tools, condensed tutorials, or assistants able to answer every technical question. To learn, you had to search, test, make mistakes, and connect different sources.

We had around 14 free trial days on Shopify to prepare the store. During that period, we started splitting the work: my partner was meant to handle some project areas, while I worked on store graphics, Facebook content, and manual product uploads.

As the days passed, more and more of the workload stayed on my shoulders. The project was never launched, we did not buy stock, and the collaboration ended in an argument.

It may seem like nothing remained. In reality, I retained an early practical foundation: I had begun to understand Shopify, graphics, product pages, and the operational work behind an online store.

Between 2019 and 2020, I went through the Lyara phase and then dropshipping. They were financially difficult experiences, but formative ones.

I learned to build e-commerce stores, create graphics and content, work with advertising, copywriting, storytelling, and conversion paths. Most importantly, I began to understand that a project cannot survive on enthusiasm alone: it needs margins, processes, selling ability, and a concrete offer.

Meanwhile, my former partner had gained sales experience in real estate. When we met again, we reconciled and decided to try again.

This time, we wanted to do things better. I brought operational skills in graphics, advertising, websites, and e-commerce. He brought a sales approach that, at least on paper, was meant to help us sell. A third person also joined, expected to handle organisational work.

For a while, it looked like a perfect combination.

We were extremely motivated. My main partner and I worked from early morning until late at night, sometimes until three or four in the morning. It did not feel like a burden: we felt we were building something that could change our future.

Shortly before we started selling, the third person left the project to move to Tuscany. That left me with my original partner, whom I will call J here.

We decided to build a web agency focused on marketing and social-media management for small local businesses. We called it Be Social.

The initial plan was simple:

• Find local businesses.
• Offer a free trial.
• Manage content, social media, and marketing.
• Turn the trial into a monthly subscription.

We tested the service with a few businesses we knew or found locally: a bar, a mechanic's workshop, and a laundry business. The problem was that the market was becoming very crowded.

It was 2022, and small social-media marketing agencies were appearing everywhere. The promise was easy to sell: visit local businesses, offer to manage Instagram and Facebook, publish posts, and charge a monthly fee. In theory, it looked like a service that could be standardised easily.

In practice, we ran into two obstacles.

The first was budget. Many small businesses did not see digital marketing as a priority. A workshop owner, for example, preferred to invest that same money in equipment, machinery, or tools needed for the business.

The second was trust. We were young and did not yet have case studies, measurable results, or a strong brand. We were asking entrepreneurs to entrust an important part of their communication to us, but did not yet have enough proof to be seen as a safe choice.

We tried to strengthen the offer by collaborating with someone with a degree in Communication Sciences. The goal was to bring more structure to communication and increase credibility with clients.

The cost was around €600 per month. For two small sole proprietorships, that was a real burden.

After roughly eight months, we had found some clients, mainly through flyer distribution and direct outreach to local businesses.

But we had a unit-economics problem. Clients were willing to pay around €90–100 per month for social-media management. In return, however, they expected a complete service:

• In-person visits.
• Photography with a camera.
• Post creation.
• Content scheduling.
• Ongoing management.
• Personal consulting.

In practice, they wanted an outsourced marketing department. We were selling it at the price of a small software subscription.

Every visit involved time, travel, fuel, preparation, content production, and support. The harder we tried to serve clients well, the less sustainable the model became.

At some point, J and I asked ourselves a simple question: if monthly social-media management did not work, why not sell e-commerce projects to small businesses?

We began looking for clients through flyers and found two herbal shops interested in digitising their sales. The price for each project was between €2,000 and €3,000. At first, it felt like a major step up.

Then we realised we were underestimating the work again. We were not only selling a website: we agreed to create the store, upload more than 600 products, take on-site photographs, and support the client in person.

The project value was higher than a €100 monthly subscription, but the time required was still enormous. Every extra request, trip, and product upload eroded the margin.

Despite that, these experiences gave us something essential: some of those clients stayed with us into the next phase.

Meanwhile, I had completed a full-stack web developer course. My technical skills started to grow, and the direction became clearer.

Be Social could not remain only a social-media management agency. The work with more value, continuity, and potential to evolve was different:

• Digitalisation for small businesses.
• Websites and presentation sites.
• E-commerce.
• Small applications.
• Operational solutions built around client processes.

When Spotex S.r.l. was born, we started almost from zero. Many clients connected only to social-media marketing did not enter the new phase. We brought around three or four clients for whom we had built websites or e-commerce stores.

That selection was useful. It forced us to understand which services we truly wanted to build and which ones were only consuming our time.

Be Social was not a perfect company. It was a real-world laboratory.

It taught me that motivation is necessary, but not enough. You can work until four in the morning and still be inside a model with impossible margins.

It taught me that sales matter, but you should not sell promises that are too large for the price. It taught me that a small client can ask for an enormous service, not out of malice, but because they do not see all the invisible work required to produce it.

It also taught me that an entrepreneurial career is not linear. Before reaching a more structured project, you can go through ideas that are too large, collaborations that end, underpriced services, and clients who force you to learn by doing.

The most important thing is to keep doing two things: stay lucid and remain consistent. You will be knocked down many times. Each time, you have to decide whether it is a signal to stop or a lesson to carry into the next project.